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Précis 
Despite ethical concerns about gene patents, virtually no empirical evidence exists to support 
claims about either positive or negative effects, and extremely little is known about the 
intellectual property protection strategies of firms and universities. This article discusses the 
results of a pilot study to examine patenting and licensing philosophies, policies, and practices 
of different types of institutions and to describe the contractual conditions for licensing DNA 
sequence inventions.  
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A Pilot Survey on the Licensing of DNA Inventions 
Michelle R. Henry 
Mildred K. Cho 
Meredith A. Weaver 
Jon F. Merz¶ 
 
Intellectual property in biotechnology invention provides important incentives for research and 
development leading to advances in genetic tests and treatments.1 However, there have been 
numerous concerns raised regarding the negative effect patents on gene sequences and their 
practical applications may have on clinical research and the availability of new medical tests and 
procedures.2 One concern is that licensing policies attempting to capture for the benefit of the 
licensor valuable rights to downstream research results and products may increase the financial 
risks and diminish potential payoffs of – and therefore motivation for – performing downstream 
research and development.3 In addition, very broad patent claims allowed by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, the sheer growth in patents claiming genetic sequences, and threats of 
overlapping patents create a veritable minefield for researchers in both academia and industry. 
The concern is that research may be stifled because of the high cost and hassle of negotiating 
access. Despite the ethical and policy concerns about gene patents, virtually no empirical 
evidence exists to support claims about either positive or negative effects.4 Importantly, 
extremely little is known about the licensing behavior of firms and universities. To begin to 
examine emerging licensing issues for patents claiming genetic sequences, examine how gene-
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 based technology is propagating, and understand how patents are influencing the sharing and use 
of fundamental genetic inventions, we performed this pilot interview study. 
 
METHODS 
We developed an open-ended telephone interview guide and piloted it with two technology 
transfer executives. The interview guide first examines patenting and out-licensing strategies, 
including the process of determining what gets patented and to whom licenses are granted. Then, 
we asked several questions addressing license negotiations, including issues of exclusivity, 
research or diagnostic uses of patented sequences, and particular terms that are difficult to 
negotiate. Finally, we asked about protecting nonpatented genetic technologies, and the use of 
Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) and Nondisclosure Agreements (NDAs).  
We identified institutions that have patented human nucleic acid sequence inventions by 
searching the Delphion patent database for patents in U.S. class 435/6 (molecular biology, 
involving nucleic acid sequence) that have “Seq. I.D.” in their claims.5 We identified forty-eight 
for-profit companies and sixty-two non-profit institutions that were assigned three or more 
patents (mean number of patents held = 19.4, range = 3–192). We excluded all foreign 
institutions. We included in our sample thirty-three non-profit institutions (thirty-two universities 
or research centers, and one institute in the National Institutes of Health (NIH)) and thirty-two 
companies; for analysis purposes, we treated the NIH as a non-profit institution. We selected the 
ten companies and ten non-profit institutions assigned the highest number of patents, and then 
randomly selected twenty-two companies and twenty-two institutions from the remaining 
samples of those who held three or more patents. We oversampled firms to address a concern 
that company technology transfer executives would be less willing to participate.  
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 During August and September of 2001, we called the technology transfer, licensing, or 
legal departments of these organizations, identified the individual or individuals responsible for 
genetic technology licensing, and attempted to conduct phone interviews regarding their 
patenting and licensing strategies and practices. 
At the conclusion of the interviews, we requested copies of respondents’ standard 
(template) licensing agreements relevant to sequence inventions. We also asked that a licensed 
patent or technology be chosen, and copies of license documents be mailed to us, with redaction 
of any specific information that our respondents believed would be commercially sensitive (e.g., 
licensor and licensee identity, covered technology, payment amounts). We secured the agreement 
of a University of Pennsylvania law professor to act as a third party for collecting and ensuring 
the anonymity of licensing agreements. We sent a fax or email reminder for the collection of 
agreements to respondents two weeks after the interviews. 
After initial review of the interview data, we found that several respondents mentioned 
the term “research tool” in their discussions regarding the distinction between the research and 
clinical or diagnostic use of a patent. To better understand what was meant by this term, we sent 
an email follow-up question to twenty-seven respondents for whom we had email addresses 
asking them to clarify and define the term and give examples. 
This study was approved by the University of Pennsylvania Committee on Studies 
Involving Human Beings, and by Stanford’s Administrative Panel on Human Subjects in Non-
medical Research. Oral informed consent was secured over the telephone from participants 
following a description of the study. All but two interviews were conducted by one of us (MRH), 
and responses were recorded in the form of written notes. 
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 Qualitative analysis of the interviews and license agreements were conducted. Two of the 
authors (MRH and JFM) developed a coding strategy and performed the coding. 
 
RESULTS  
We contacted sixty-five organizations. Of these, nineteen did not participate. Five technology 
transfer executives contacted did not return phone calls; three said that although they were the 
correct contact at their organization, they did not have enough experience to help; five declined 
because of a staffing shortage or heavy workload; five declined as part of a policy not to 
participate in interviews or because they simply had received too many requests to participate in 
them; and one declined without explanation. We conducted interviews with representatives of 
nineteen of thirty-two companies (59%) and twenty-seven of thirty-three non-profit institutions 
(82%) (χ2 = 3.96, p < 0.05), for a total sample of forty-six organizations. Our final response 
rates from the initial sample were nineteen of forty-eight firms (40%) and twenty-seven of sixty-
two non-profits (44%). There was no relationship between number of patents held and 
willingness to participate for either firms or non-profit institutions. We received a total of ten 
anonymized license agreements and standard licensing templates. In this paper, we present the 
results of the interviews only. 
Patenting strategies 
Our results show that respondents in universities have different patenting strategies than those 
representing commercial entities. We asked respondents to describe their strategies for patenting 
DNA sequences. There were two predominant models that emerged, largely associated with the 
profit-status of the organization. Five respondents from companies, and only one respondent 
from a non-profit, discussed maintaining patent portfolios as part of their overall business 
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 strategy. These firms detailed a “blocking” approach to keep others out of an intellectual 
property area and a “defensive” approach to defend a stake in an area. These firms mentioned 
strategies such as filing patent applications for all inventions and then dropping technologies 
later if there was no commercial interest, patenting only those technologies related to current 
programs or interests, and patenting as a way to prevent others from commercializing. Non-profit 
institutions appeared to be more selective. Respondents from fifteen non-profit institutions and 
three companies stated that determining patentability (novelty, usefulness, and non-obviousness) 
is a necessary step in the patenting strategy. Demonstrating that an invention meets these 
requirements is mandatory for all patent applications, and the added emphasis placed on this step 
suggests that non-profits may undertake a more careful and discriminatory approach to deciding 
what merits filing a patent application.  
This difference in selectivity is evident when the number of invention disclosures 
received is compared to the number of patent applications respondents had filed on nucleic acid 
sequence inventions in the prior two-year period. Excluding one extreme outlier from our 
sample, companies reported that they received an average of thirty-seven invention disclosures 
(range = 0–100) and filed an average of thirty-two patent applications (86%) in the last two 
years. Non-profits received an average of 163 disclosures (range = 0–600) and filed an average 
of twenty-four applications (15%). A recent study conducted by Mowery et al., examining the 
practices of three university technology transfer offices (Stanford, Columbia, and the University 
of California system) similarly found that between 1986 and 1990, disclosure to application 
filing rates of these academic institutions were between 15% and 17%.6  
 
Licensing strategies 
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 We asked about strategies for licensing out technology, including methods for finding 
licensees, preferred licensing positions, difficulties in negotiations, and ways in which 
nonpatented nucleic acid sequences are protected.  
Marketing and purpose of out-licensing 
 Companies and non-profits granted licenses to their DNA sequence patents at a relatively 
similar rate (42% of firms’ total owned portfolio of DNA sequence patents versus 51% of non-
profits’) but reported differing strategies for finding a licensee to commercialize their 
technologies. Non-profits were more likely than firms to report careful market analysis to ensure 
a patent would be licensed even prior to the filing for a patent application. Six non-profit 
institutions actively market to attract potential licensees, while no respondents from commercial 
firms noted this as part of their licensing strategy. Three respondents from commercial firms 
mentioned a preference for cross-licensing and five noted a strategy of licensing out technologies 
of no immediate interest, while respondents from non-profit institutions did not comment on 
either strategy. Licensing was essentially used only to transfer inventions into industry for 
commercialization, and licensing to universities by companies was the exception with only four 
firms saying that they have licensed to universities. 
Character of licensees 
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, patent holders of products resulting from federally sponsored research 
must demonstrate preference in licensing to small businesses.7 Perhaps reflecting compliance 
with this federal requirement, six respondents from non-profit institutions expressed a preference 
for licensing out to small companies and start-ups. Two companies and thirteen non-profit 
institutions said that they were willing to accept equity and payment plans involving higher 
royalties, as well as milestone payments in lieu of large up-front sums, from these small 
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 companies. Regardless of profit status or size, fourteen respondents remarked that smaller 
companies were easier to work with than either large or mid-size for-profit organizations or non-
profit institutions. Likewise, fourteen respondents noted that having a previous successful 
relationship with the licensee or experience in negotiating licenses for other gene sequence 
patents made the deal go more smoothly. 
Exclusivity 
We were interested in examining the usage patterns and prevalence of exclusive versus 
nonexclusive licensing. There were wide disparities in reported strategies, ranging from those 
who grant only exclusive licenses to those who grant no exclusive licenses, with the majority 
using them selectively. In a previous study of a select sample of genetic diagnosis patents, 
Schissel et al. found that exclusive licenses were frequently used by non-profit universities and 
hospitals.8 Here, we found that companies were substantially less likely than non-profits to 
license DNA sequence inventions exclusively. Of all licenses ever granted to these technologies, 
companies reported an average of 27% to be exclusive (standard deviation = 38.1, range = 0–
100%) compared to 68% of those granted by non-profits (standard deviation = 26.0, range = 0–
100%) (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution p = 0.001).  
We also asked respondents under what circumstances exclusive licensing is used. Six 
respondents stated that exclusive licenses were used as incentives to attract licensees. 
Additionally, two non-profits mentioned that they offered exclusive licenses to small companies. 
Respondents from five companies and seven non-profit organizations noted the use of 
nonexclusive licenses for access to research tools and non-patented materials, and two firms and 
two non-profit organizations noted a preference for nonexclusive licenses in general. Further 
reflecting wide variation of licensing strategies, one respondent noted the sole use of exclusive 
 8
 licenses for diagnostic applications while another emphasized the use of nonexclusive licenses 
for these. Respondents also commented on the nature of both exclusive and nonexclusive 
licenses, saying that as part of their strategies, revenues generated from exclusive licenses must 
cover patent costs and have milestones, while nonexclusive licenses allow more leeway in 
negotiating financial terms (including the amounts and timing of payments, and the taking of 
equity).  
Research versus clinical uses and research tools 
In light of concerns that licensing arrangements may stifle downstream research as well as the 
ability of industry to develop diagnostic or predictive tests that are based on patented genes or 
disease-gene associations, we asked if respondents distinguish between research and clinical or 
diagnostic uses in licensing.  
Fourteen companies and twenty-three non-profit institutions indicated that they 
distinguish between research and clinical uses in the licensing of nucleic acid sequence 
inventions. When asked to define the term “research,” twelve respondents defined research as 
noncommercial use, seven defined the term as “internal” research and development, four said 
that research does not require regulatory approval (apparently distinguishing FDA-approved 
products), and four commented that commercial firms are unable by definition to perform 
noncommercial research. Six respondents said that they reserved the right to continue with their 
own institution’s research when they licensed out technology. Six respondents said that they 
made the distinction between research and clinical uses by granting field of use licenses. Overall, 
thirty-six of the forty-six respondents noted generally that they resort to field of use or claim 
limitations to facilitate dividing a patent into multiple licenses as well as to retain rights to 
continue their own use of the invention. 
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 Several respondents broached the topic of research tools during this discussion. 
Respondents from one commercial firm and six non-profit institutions said that research tools 
should be licensed nonexclusively and widely disseminated. Two interviewees commented that 
DNA is a research tool, one said that non-human genes are research tools, and one noted that 
their licensing arrangements for research tools do not include reach-through provisions or 
royalties.  
To better understand what technologies fall under the term “research tool,” we emailed 
twenty-seven respondents who had provided their email addresses during the initial interview, 
and asked them to define “research tool” and provide examples of inventions that they consider 
tools and those they do not. Eleven interviewees (41%) responded, all via email. In general, 
research tools were described as “a composition, sequence, method or process” that is useful in 
biomedical research for discovering, verifying, or studying another material or process.  
Respondents discussed the development, patenting, and licensing of technologies they 
considered to be research tools. Respondents commented that tools do not require much 
development in order to be useful (n = 3), do not require patent protection because they “would 
not become a commercial product or part of a product” (n = 3), are typically licensed 
nonexclusively (n = 2), and should not be subjected to reach-through terms (n = 2).  
 Of the nucleic acid sequence technologies that could be considered research tools, 
respondents cited the Cohen Boyer Recombinant DNA technology (U.S. Pat. No. 4,237,224), 
DNA vectors and probes, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) primers, and genes themselves. 
Among the materials that respondents gave as examples of gene sequence technologies that are 
not research tools were materials being used to develop a diagnostic test, those that have 
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 potential therapeutic use, such as the monoclonal antibody that is currently being used as a 
treatment for Crohn’s Disease, and biological reagents with diagnostic or commercial potential. 
Two respondents representing non-profit institutions specifically noted the distinction 
between a “tool” and a “target.” One of these respondents commented that “a drug target or a 
disease diagnostic is not generally considered a research tool,” and the other remarked “genes 
that are drug targets are viewed by large companies as research tools, but small companies feel 
that they are not research tools” (emphasis was the respondent’s own). Several respondents noted 
that often a technology used as an investigative tool by one organization was itself originally 
researched and developed into an end product by another. It is evident from the responses that 
the definition is in part attributable to the perspective of the organization, and encompasses the 
intended use of the material. 
Licensing experiences 
 Terms negotiated  
In an attempt to determine whether research or other activities have been inhibited or facilitated 
by patents and licenses, we asked whether any licensing negotiations failed, and if so, how many 
in the last year, why, and what licensing terms were most problematic. In the negotiation of 
licenses, material transfer agreements (MTAs) and nondisclosure agreements (NDAs), each party 
has contractual terms and conditions that are sticking points, as well as some specific issues that 
could potentially break the deal. We were interested in looking at the most common terms 
negotiated, whether or not these were the same across all types of negotiations, and whether they 
were related to the profit status or size of the organization. (see Table 1). 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
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 In licensing agreements, three main areas of difficulty arose: payment terms, terms that 
shift contract risks, and the retention of rights to downstream development (so-called reach-
through clauses). Determining the value of a technology is a critical step in developing a solid 
licensing plan, and other financial terms, such as royalty schedules and amounts, are based on 
this initial assessment. Financial terms, including the amount of upfront payment, royalty rates, 
and milestone payments, were the most prevalent source of disagreement. Another area of 
difficulty for both companies and non-profit institutions was negotiating and defining rights to 
the use of the invention and subsequently derived products. Overall, respondents conveyed the 
idea that the licensor often wishes to retain rights to future intellectual property, as well as rights 
to continue work with the licensed technology, and the licensee often wishes to gain the right to 
sublicense the invention. Contract risks, including issues of indemnification, warranties, 
enforcement and due diligence, were the third most troublesome to negotiate. 
Rights to future intellectual property 
Most licensing programs involving DNA sequence inventions must account for downstream 
technologies derived from the invention. Respondents stated that agreeing on the distribution of 
reward from future discoveries and developments from the licensed invention is among the most 
difficult issues in licensing of patents (n = 18), MTAs (n = 25), and NDAs (n = 2). Reach-
through clauses are a leading concern, regardless of profit status or size of the licensor 
organization, and were cited by four interviewees as a cause for negotiation breakdown.  
Negotiation breakdown 
Nearly three-quarters of all respondents (n = 33) said that they had at least one 
negotiation break down without agreement in the past year. Sixteen respondents representing 
commercial firms reported at least one negotiation in the past year that was not completed, and 
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 seventeen representatives of non-profits responded similarly. Financial terms, as described 
above, were the primary cause of failed negotiations (n = 24), followed by problems with 
agreeing on the field and scope of use (n = 6). The next largest causes of negotiation failures 
were not term related, but rather personality conflict (n = 2) or a diminished interest in 
completing the deal (n = 3).  
Material transfer agreements and nondisclosure agreements 
All respondents reported using MTAs and NDAs for protection of nonpatented proprietary 
information and materials. Only one respondent reported that MTAs were not required, although 
they were still used in most transfers of materials into the institution and out to both for-profit 
and non-profit institutions. According to respondents, MTAs are used for unprotected (i.e., 
unpatented) or nonvaluable materials that are to be evaluated by potential licensees, or materials 
or data that are being used purely for research purposes. Ten companies and seventeen 
universities said that they used MTAs with both universities and companies. Four respondents 
commented that they used two templates, one for transfer to industry and the other to non-profit 
institutions, while seven universities specifically said that they used the Uniform Biological 
Material Transfer Agreement (UBMTA) drafted by the National Institutes of Health.9 
Most respondents commented that of all negotiations, NDAs were the simplest, most 
standardized, and least troublesome. This is evidenced by the fact that there were only eight 
sticking points mentioned in NDA negotiations, compared to seventeen in licensing agreements, 
and twelve in MTA negotiations. (see Table 2) 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
We asked the question how – aside from the use of patent licenses, MTAs, and NDAs – 
are nucleic acid sequence technologies protected. A few respondents mentioned tangible research 
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 material licenses or tangible property licenses (n = 2) and bailments (n = 2). In discussing these 
alternatives, respondents commented that tangible research material licenses for research use 
require less negotiation, and therefore less time, and have fewer risks than do standard patent 
licenses. Bailments were described as a stronger form of transfer than MTAs, falling in between 
MTAs and licenses, and restricting use for research purposes only. Bailments were used with 
commercial entities, and were always nonexclusive. 
Licensing agreement collection  
Despite the firewall safeguards we set in place (i.e., securing the agreement of a law professor to 
collect and anonymize agreements), respondents were, for the most part, unwilling to provide us 
with copies of negotiated agreements. The primary reasons for refusal were that respondents 
were simply too busy to devote the time involved in choosing an appropriate license agreement 
and removing identifying information from it, or were concerned that they would have to secure 
approvals from their licensees because of confidentiality clauses. 
 
DISCUSSION 
There are two primary findings of this pilot study. First, our results suggest that companies and 
non-profit institutions differ in patenting selectivity and patterns of exclusive license use. For-
profit respondents reported the more expensive strategy of broadly filing patent applications, 
compared to the strategy of non-profit respondents (who received more invention disclosures 
than firms) of selective filing. Second, we find that non-profit academic, health-care, and 
research institutions are slightly more likely to license their DNA sequence inventions than for-
profit firms, and are much more likely to grant exclusive licenses to these patents.  
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 For comparison, a survey of academic technology transfer executives showed that 
roughly 50% of licenses granted by universities in 1999 are exclusive,10 while only about 22% 
of licenses granted by the NIH in 2001, and fewer than 16% of active licenses managed by the 
NIH Office of Technology Transfer, are exclusive.11 Thus, the use of exclusive licenses by non-
profit institutions seems to exceed that of firms for the same technology, as well as the use by 
universities and the NIH for all technologies.  
The asymmetries in patenting and licensing strategies may be related. These disparities 
may suggest a fundamental difference in the types of invention generated by companies and non-
profit institutions (primarily universities). As previously indicated, numerous respondents noted 
a difference between research tools and research targets, commenting that the definition is 
partially attributable to the perspective of the organization, and encompasses the intended use of 
the material. Respondents also stated that tools useful for performing research should be licensed 
nonexclusively and be made broadly available, while exclusive licensing was viewed as 
necessary to promote investment in downstream research on promising targets and development 
of products.12 Basic sequences are useful as targets for downstream development of therapies, 
and previous research by Thomas et al. showed the predominance of universities and other 
public institutions in basic genetic discovery.13 Therefore, the high prevalence of exclusive 
licensing by universities may reflect a desire to make targets available for development while the 
less extensive use of exclusive licenses by companies suggests that firms are less likely to license 
targets to others for development, that their research does not generate targets, or that targets are 
simply a smaller fraction of their research product.14 
The high proportion of exclusive licenses by non-profits raises the implication that 
invention coming out of non-profit institutions is more likely to be tied up with exclusive rights. 
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 However, our results, and those of Mowery et al.15 show that only 15% of university DNA 
sequence inventions are patented, suggesting that the bulk of such inventions will be made freely 
available upon scientific publication. Non-profit inventions (as defined by invention disclosures) 
are much less likely to be patented at all, are slightly more likely to be licensed and, if licensed, 
are much more likely to be on an exclusive basis. However, since universities are not in the 
business of making, using, or selling patented products or services, they use patents for licensing 
out their technologies so that they may be further developed. The authors do not know of any 
cases of universities patenting either offensively or defensively.16 Thus, overall, the majority of 
DNA sequence based inventions generated in non-profit institutions appear not to be patented or 
licensed, and therefore not bound up by intellectual property claims.  
 Aside from somewhat uniform treatment of research tools, our study shows that there is 
no standard approach of institutions to exclusive licensing, and our respondents reported 
practices that vary widely. For example, the disagreement about the exclusivity of diagnostics 
suggests that there is no broad agreement in the biotechnology market about how best to move an 
invention into use, particularly when little or no further development is required. This poses 
some difficult questions regarding the best use of government-funded inventions, including those 
developed in academic institutions.17 Importantly, exclusivity may be inappropriate if the sole 
licensee of a technology restricts public access in some way, thereby undermining the goal of 
federal funding benefiting the general public. Bayh-Dole mandates that preference be given to 
small businesses in licensing government-funded technology exclusively. All respondents from 
non-profit institutions reported that they license to small businesses. Small – and particularly 
start-up – businesses, in turn, may require exclusive rights to establish competitive advantage 
and give them access to high-risk capital. The prevalence of exclusive licenses granted by non-
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 profits may reflect the preference for licensing to small businesses mandated by Bayh-Dole, 
although we cannot determine this based on our results. If this is so, then an unintended 
consequence of the preference may be the frequent use of exclusive arrangements in transfer of 
technology discovered with federal monies. Exclusive licensing raises several concerns, 
including the risk that competition might be stifled as firms are prevented from pursuing 
particular areas of research. The problem posed may be compounded if the small business 
preference results in licensing of parties who are not in the best position to move an invention 
toward commercial viability, due to limited access to capital and other resources (including, for 
example, access to underlying intellectual property and technical know-how as well as personnel 
with necessary competencies).  
Companies were more likely to adopt a broad patenting strategy to develop portfolios that 
could be used to block others from developing an area or to defend the firm’s ability to work in a 
particular field. Broad patenting can be used by companies to ensure return on investments, to 
give them bargaining power with competitors and collaborators, and, defensively, to protect their 
ability to work and compete in a particular field or area. Non-profits were more likely to report 
that they undertook careful market analysis to ensure a patent would be used before filing. 
Several non-profit respondents reported filing provisional patent applications to retain rights to 
an invention while exploring whether there was a market for the invention.  
There are continuing concerns that an increase in use of the patent system to divvy up 
proprietary rights to the human genome may delay dissemination of research tools among 
scientists, and therefore hinder or even stifle research. The 1998 Report of the National Institutes 
of Health Working Group on Research Tools addressed difficulties for biomedical researchers in 
negotiating access to research tools. The Working Group broadly defined research tools to 
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 include all resources used in the laboratory, and to exclude all that would be sold to nonresearch 
consumers. Included in this definition are “cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal 
models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and 
cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines, databases and 
computer software.”18 The Working Group advised that guiding principles regarding the transfer 
of research tools acceptable across all segments of the biomedical research community be 
developed. Although those who responded to our question regarding the definition of nucleic 
acid sequence research tools did not differ greatly in their interpretations, there was no single 
approach to defining the difference between the research and clinical or diagnostic use of a 
nucleic acid sequence. Respondents’ definitions of each of these terms varied extensively (e.g., 
the definition of “clinical” ranged in meaning from an entrance into clinical trials to being a term 
interchangeable with “commercialization”).  
Furthermore, overvaluation of new technologies may be common among the discoverers 
and was cited by several respondents as a barrier to successful negotiations. We believe that this 
problem will persist in the short term, but ultimately market forces will result in greater 
consensus regarding valuation, as licensing and technology transfer executives gain experience 
and successfully move inventions into the development pipeline.  
STUDY LIMITATIONS 
There are several limitations of this study. First, this was a pilot study of a limited number of 
licensing and technology transfer managers in universities, government agencies, and companies, 
and was not designed to estimate the frequency with which issues and problems arise. Second, 
we asked about a very narrow class of invention, nucleic acid sequences, and it is quite likely 
that respondents generalized from their broader licensing experiences to this narrowly defined 
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 class of invention. However, this is not necessarily a problem because it may indicate that they 
treat these inventions the same as other technologies that they patent and license.  
Finally, respondents stated that agreeing on the distribution of reward from future 
discoveries and developments from the licensed invention is among the most difficult issues they 
face in licensing. We did not collect detailed information from respondents regarding what 
specific terms are being negotiated or how the issue is being resolved. Further study of this issue 
is warranted to understand how the market is distributing the long-term financial benefits and 
risks of gene-based discoveries and downstream developments.  
CONCLUSION 
The results presented in this paper demonstrate widely varying strategies used by companies and 
universities to protect gene sequence discoveries and to commercialize their gene sequence 
patents. Further, we find that there are several main areas of contention in negotiating access to 
these technologies, particularly those involving the distribution of the financial risks and 
potential benefits resulting from downstream developments. Further study is necessary to 
evaluate whether these practices, or the asymmetry between companies and non-profit 
organizations, have effects on the diffusion of technologies and the ability of university and 
commercial researchers to conduct research and bring gene-based products to market. 
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 Table 1: Difficult Issues in Licensing Negotiation 
 Nonprofit  
n = 27 (%)
For-Profit  
n = 19 (%) 
Total 
n = 46 (%)
Financial terms (amounts of and timing of payments, 
the taking of equity) 
18 (67) 12 (63) 30 (65) 
Future intellectual property/sub-licensing (distribution 
of reward from future discoveries and developments) 
9 (33) 9 (47) 18 (39) 
Indemnification/warranties 7 (26) 4 (21) 11 (24) 
Scope of patent, license, or field of use 3 (11) 7 (37) 10 (22) 
Due diligence (insurance that the technology will not 
languish) 
4 (15) 1 (5) 5 (11) 
Patent prosecution costs 4 (15) 0 (0) 4 (9) 
Retention of rights to continue own use of the 
invention for research 
4 (15) 0 (0) 4 (9) 
Enforcement of patent rights 1 (4) 2 (11) 3 (7) 
Choice of law/venue 3 (11) 0 (0) 3 (7) 
Publication (concerns about delay and control) 2 (7) 1 (5) 3 (7) 
Nonfinancial terms (respondents specifically 
commented that difficulties were not financial) 
3 (11) 0 (0) 3 (7) 
Duration of agreement 1 (4) 1 (5) 2 (4) 
Assignment of patent costs  2 (7) 0 (0) 2 (4) 
Exclusivity 0 (0) 2 (11) 2 (4) 
Other (third-party-sponsored research, rights of first 
refusal) 
2 (7) 2 (11) 4 (9) 
None 1 (4) (0) 1 (2) 
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Table 2: Difficult Issues by Type of Agreement 
 
 Licenses 
n = 46 (%)
MTA 
n = 46 (%) 
NDA 
n = 46 (%)
Financial terms (amounts of and timing of payments, 
the taking of equity) 
30 (65) 1 (2) 1 (2) 
Future intellectual property/sub-licensing (distribution 
of reward from future discoveries and developments) 
18 (39) 25 (54) 2 (4) 
Indemnification/warranties 11 (24) 3 (7) 1 (2) 
Scope of patent, license, or field of use 10 (22) 3 (7) 0 (0) 
Due diligence (insurance that the technology will not 
languish) 
5 (11) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Patent Prosecution 4 (9) 1 (2) 0 (0) 
Retention of rights to continue own use of the 
invention for research 
4 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Enforcement 3 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Choice of law/venue 3 (7) 1 (2) 5 (11) 
Publication (concerns about delay and control) 3 (7) 15 (33) 1 (2) 
Non-financial terms (respondents specifically 
commented that difficulties were not financial) 
3 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Duration of agreement 2 (4) 2 (4) 21 (46) 
Assignment of patent costs 2 (4) 1 (2) 0 (0) 
Exclusivity 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Definition of materials 0 (0) 2 (4) 0 (0) 
Writing requirements (putting confidentiality 
agreement into writing) 
0 (0) 1 (2) 5 (11) 
Injunctive relief 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (4) 
Confidentiality (what is confidential, how many 
people are allowed access to confidential information) 
1 (2) 1 (2) 6 (13) 
Other (third-party-sponsored research, rights of first 
refusal) 
3 (7) 1 (2) 0 (0) 
None 1 (2) 1 (2) 0 (0) 
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